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Introduction
By KENT HOLLINGSWORTH*
For several decades before and after World War II, Senator
Richard P. Moloney tended the socio-economic needs of his constituency in the northeast section of Lexington, Kentucky. Appurtenant thereunto, he collected an imposing array of anecdotal material which he used to advantage in playing cards and
the horses with bankers, judges, editors, constables and men of
the cloth. At the same time, with two other power brokers, he
generally managed the political affairs of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky with a wisdom and concern no successor has brought
to the task.
Senator Moloney sent me my first client: "Young man, saw in
the paper this morning you had passed your bar exams and were
admitted to practice by the Court of Appeals. Remembering how
disappointed your family was when your father's Kendor ran
dead last in the 1946 Kentucky Derby, I thought you might like
to take this case."
Well, he was exactly right. While I was academically prepared only to draft a brief for argument before the United States
Supreme Court, and still unaware of how or where to file for collection of small sums owed, I nonetheless was eager to take any
kind of case.
"Figuring you would specialize in horse law, I would like for
you to handle a matter of some importance to me as it concerns a
friend of mine-a friend as was his father, and his father before
him. My friend in this matter is gainfully employed as a gofer in
the Turf Bar on North Lime, runs errands and cheerfully renders
any service as may be required by the proprietor and customers
of the house.
"Last Saturday, a customer inquired of Stubby if he could
handle some action on the Kentucky Derby. Oh, no, Stubby replied, he never made no book. Well, did Stubby know where a
.Editor of THE BLOOD-HoRsE. A.B., 1950; LL.B., J.D. 1959, University of Kentucky.
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sport might get a bet down? Stubby said that he did not, but that
he used to know a man who would take a small bet now and then
from a friend. Whereupon the customer produced a $10 bill and
asked Stubby if he would be kind enough to renew this acquaintance to the extent of getting $10 placed on Tomy Lee's nose.
"Being of generous nature, with naught but satisfaction of
good-deed performance as consideration for this errand, Stubby
hurried off to the Rose Bud Cafe and got the money down-with
a person unknown to authorities and not a party to this action.
"As you know, Bill Shoemaker brought Tomy Lee down by
the precise margin mentioned, beating Sword Dancer by a nose,
at 3.70-1 odds. In making his usual Monday morning rounds,
Stubby duly picked up the $47 winnings, and when the customer
reappeared that afternoon, Stubby promptly handed over this
sum with a congratulatory smile.
"As a usual thing, a runner gets ten percent, and Stubby was
hoping maybe that would be rounded off to a fiver, but to his dismay, he did not get $5, nor even $4.70. What he got was the
flash of a badge, and the long arm of the law reached out and
clasped his sagging shoulder with a charge of illegal bookmaking.
"Of course, Stubby never made book in his life, but the layer
of odds in this particular instance is unlikely to come forward
and assert his participation in the transaction, so as to prove
Stubby's innocence to the charge. Fortunately, there appears to
be sufficient evidence to support a defense of entrapment by
which, if raised timely by counsel in police court this afternoon,
justice may be served."
Apart from client and defense, Senator Moloney proffered
advice of great, sustained value: "I would suggest that you obtain
a $100 retainer before you go to court-against the chance of
your client's lessening appreciation of your services later. At least
you thereby will have in hand something out of the 1959 Kentucky Derby as partial recompense for Kendor's Derby performance of 1946."
While this foray into the labyrinth of horse law proved to be
a personal triumph, there remained an overshadowing disappointment. This, really, was not the kind of case I had thought
would come my way as an intended specialist in a narrow, highly
technical, area of jurisprudence which I had conceived as em-
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bracing the law of the horse.
At the University of Kentucky, I had the singular good fortune to come under the casual tutelage of Professor A.B.
McEwen, a Virginia gentleman keen on the intricacies of common law pleadings. Although these technicalities had been
superseded by adoption of the federal rules of procedure. Professor McEwen continued to revel in the exactitudes of assumpsit,
trover and replevin, and in classroom interchanges kept his students on the defensive with quick surrejoinders and surrebutters.
It was in his History of the Law seminar that Professor McEwen
suggested that I draft a paper on the development of the law as it
pertained to the horse.
The suggestion that I attempt a scholarly paper on horse law
arose in part from Professor McEwen's regular rounds of golf
with Paul Ebelhardt, manager of Calumet Farm at the time it
tended to win Kentucky Derbys with unprecedented regularity.
At Calumet was Citation, whose reputation as a great race horse
is level with that of Man o' War and Secretariat; Citation was
standing as a stallion for an extraordinarily high stud fee at the
time, $5,000. This sum had been paid by Royce Martin for the
privilege of breeding to Citation one of his mares, to-wit, Silver
Sal.
Martin was a fascinating adventurer. At one time the comptroller for Pancho Villa's Mexican operation, he was said to have
come north with a money belt while Pancho was suffering military misadventure. Martin invested wisely and subsequently became president of Auto-Lite. The best chance Martin ever had to
win the Kentucky Derby was rith his home-bred colt Goyamo in
1954, but Eddie Arcaro brought Goyamo down in fourth place,
and moments after this disappointment, Martin died.
In the Martin estate dispersal, Silver Sal was sold to Ira Drymon, who resold her in the regular Keeneland breeding stock
auction to Shawnee Farm for $13,000-the price largely determined by her being in foal to Citation. The mare aborted a week
later.
Was there a $5,000 refund of the stud fee due when Silver Sal
failed to produce a live foal? If so, to whom was it due? The
agreement to breed to Citation on a live-foal basis was an oral
one. In the regular course of business, Calumet Farm had subse-
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quently sent a postcard to Martin confirming the reservation to
breed and price thereof. On the reverse of the card was a unilateral assertion: "Conditions-Calumet Farm insures a live foal
ONLY to the owner of a mare at the time she is bred, and under
no circumstances will any refund be paid to anyone in the event
the mare is sold or changes ownership."
The above, if not rising to the dignity of a custom of the
trade, at least was a common practice in Central Kentucky. It
was a practice based upon a vague premise that stallion managers, when accepting mares for breeding on a live-foal basis,
considered the relative ability of the mare owner, in the way of
care, feeding and general horsemanship, as would bear on the
mare's carrying a fetus full term. There was an unexpressed notion that a stallion contract on a live-foal basis was a personal
contract, unassignable to the extent of permitting a mare to be
sold into the custody and care of a horseman of lesser abilities as
would increase the probability of abortion, and refunding of the
stud fee.
Postcard recital of this practice notwithstanding, Calumet
Farm promptly sent a check for $5,000 to Shawnee Farm. This
was in keeping with Calumet's peculiar commercial policy of
keeping regular, live customers of Calumet stallions, such as
Shawnee (Martin was dead), happy.
Attorneys for the Martin estate, unfamiliar with trade practices and unaware of the dog-eat-dog competition for full stallion
books, but in the routine business of collecting the assets of an estate, casually inquired of both Calumet and Shawnee if perhaps
that $5,000 refund did not belong to the Martin estate.
In all equity, it did not. Unknown to Shepardizing legal
scholars, the buyer of an in-foal broodmare establishes his limit,
as to the price he will bid on the mare, on the expected price the
fetus she is carrying subsequently might bring as a yearling. The
Martin estate realized a return on its $5,000 Citation stud fee in
the relatively high price the mare brought while in foal; Shawnee
suffered a loss when the mare failed to produce a live foal by Citation.
This was a horse case of the first impression, but, as were
most such cases before 1960, it was settled prior to judicial review
and reporting. Attorneys for the estate were satisfied with the
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proffered statements of several prominent horsemen that a stallion contract was terminated with sale of an in-foal mare; the
first purchaser was one of those horsemen who stated that custom
of the trade precluded refunding of stud fee to a purchaser of an
in-foal mare that aborted, and he declared that he personally did
not contemplate receipt of a refund when he purchased the
mare; and the ultimate purchaser of the mare was delighted, of
course, with receipt of a $5,000 donation. As a result of this controversy, a written provision was inserted as a condition of sale in
virtually all North American auction catalogues. This provision
expressly stated that no refund of a stud fee would be due a purchaser of an in-foal mare if the mare aborted after purchase.
Because he was intrigued by his golfing partner's case, and
further piqued when cursory search of West Key Numbers revealed few headnotes pertinent to Thoroughbreds, Professor
McEwen suggested the assembling of citations to cases which
might provide a basis for the current status of the law of the
horse. Like King Pellinore's unending quest, this was a task unlikely to be accomplished in a lifetime, and a semester's devotion
to it resulted in a prolix narrative ambiguously entitled, "Racing
Through the Law," with but twenty-three reported cases cited in
support of general propositions.
Actually, I filled a yellow pad with issues from some 200 reported cases. In retrospect, only two of these invite re-reading.
State Racing Commission v. Latonia AgriculturalAssociation,'
apart from its being the landmark decision upholding the constitutionality of a racing commission and its power to grant and revoke licenses, is enriched by the lyric quality of the opinion written by Kentucky's celebrated Chief Justice Edward O'Rear, Sr.
By way of dictum, he reveals a respect and admiration for the
horse, a sensitivity to the romance and lore of the horse that is
uncommon to the bench.
The other case worthy of review by anyone concerned with
squabbles among racing men is lengthily styled, The Famous
Turf Cause, of BURDON againstRHODES, tried at the Guildhall, York, before Mr. Baron Thomson, and a special Jury, on
Wednesday, the 10th day of August, 1791, to which are added
1123 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1909).
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some observations on the merits of the case as well as on the singular circumstancesattendingthe trial, duly repoited by "A BYSTANDER." The gravamen here is that th~e winner of a race for
gentlemen riders, an affluent country squire, was no gentleman.
A purported transcript of testimony in this trial of mores may be
found in the incomparable Keeneland Association Library.
While the paper resulting from my search for horse cases was
piffle and tosh, my work product did prove useful. During my
first year of practice, I was awakened one afternoon by a knock
on the office door. Again, it was not the knock of a client. He was
a horse player, who had taken his fascination with the game back
to law school at Indiana University, and there was attempting to
compile a bibliography for a paper on the law of the horse.
This was John Humphreys, who took my yellow pad and carried it much further, adding more than a hundred citations.
Many of these were to unreported trial court cases with written
opinions, obtained from Lexington attorneys Gayle Mohney and
Bill Gess, whose files contained documentation of a half-century
of controversies between Kentucky horsemen. Humphreys also
wrote to all twenty-nine state racing commissions and obtained
many citations to horse cases theretofore obscured under headings such as Theatre, Gaming, Administrative Law and unlikelier spots to find a horse.
Encouraged by Judge Garrett Claypool, a horse breeder and
member of the Ohio Racing Commission, Humphreys continued
to work on this project long after his graduation and well into
the night at his law office in South Bend, Indiana. He assembled
his citations under chapter headings, wrote, updated and summarized. Culmination of this work was publication in 1963 by
the National Association of State Racing Commissioners
(NASRC) of Humphreys" Racing Law, the first useful volume addressing this esoteric subject. His second volume was published in
1966. While working on his third volume, Humphreys died in
1970. Wendell Bayse, professor of law at the University of Oregon, completed Racing Law III in 1973, and supplements thereto have been written by NASRC Executive Vice President Warren Schweder. These three volumes of Racing Law, together
with T.A. Davis' Horse Owners and Breeders Tax Manual, first
published by the American Horse Council in 1978, comprised
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"The Library" for all attorneys whose clients happen to have
beneficial interests in horses. To this library now must be added
the present issue of the Kentucky Law Journal.
Twenty years ago, there was no need for such a symposium,
for indeed there was no recognized body of law pertaining to the
horse. There was no interest in it. There was no money in it.
Prior to 1960, horses commonly were sold "on the cuff' for a
few thousand dollars, i.e., breeders would transfer possession of
a horse, and indicia of ownership as represented by the horse's
registration certificate, to a trainer with an understanding that
the sale price would be paid from one-half of the horse's purse
earnings. This was, to both laymen and lawyers, a hazardous
contract, dependent upon an uncertain event, a race horse's
earning any part of a purse. When the horse proved slow, converting an asset into a liability, the uncertainty was as to who
would pay the feed and shipping bills.
Some of my first small fees were earned by reducing to writing these oral, executory contracts and annexing these instruments to registration certificates, so as to give notice of same to
both the track racing secretary and horsemen's bookkeeper.
Need for this innovative paper work came when cuff-sale
prices rose to $10,000 and $20,000 and the vendor wished to apprise the racing secretary that the horse's entry should not be accepted for a race from which it might be claimed for less than the
original sale price, and to apprise the horsemen's bookkeeper, an
informal garnishee, as to how much and to whom he should disperse purse earnings. Further, racing commissions were becoming more concerned with who actually owned the horse, who
should be licensed as an owner and who should be denied a license as an "undesirable."
For almost a century, through good times and bad, the price
of a race horse remained much the same-$1,000 and anything
more-you-can-get-for-him. As the latter price factor rose after
World War II, the value of a good horse more frequently was expressed in six figures. Owners of good race horses ready for retirement to stud considered the tax consequences of selling a stallion
prospect. and capital gains treatment of this six-figure price, or
retaining the horse as a stallion and receiving annual stud fees as
normal income; owners were ready to sell. On the other hand, a
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single breeder was reluctant to invest a great deal of money in a
sire prospect. To spread the cost, and the risk, groups of breeders
joined to buy expensive stallions, the cost of purchase and maintenance being prorated on a share basis, with owners of undivided fractional interests in the stallion being entitled to breed to
the stallion without payment of stud fee. Thus began stallion
syndication.
While there had been partnership, or small-group purchase
of high-priced stallions previously-Sweep in 1913, Sir Gallahad
III in 1925, and Blenheim II in 1936-modern stallion syndication in North America may be said to have begun in 1947 when
Leslie Combs II and his uncles, Brownell and Lucas Combs, purchased Beau Pere for $100,000 from Louis B. Mayer of MetroGoldwyn-Mayer. Within twenty-four hours, twenty shares in
Beau Pere were resold to breeders at $5,000 each. It was an inauspicious beginning for stallion syndication because 20-year-old
Beau Pere abruptly died before a shareholder had a chance to
breed a single mare to him. The spreading of this risk apparently
was appreciated, for in the next year, 1948, Combs purchased
Alibhai from Mayer for a then-record $500,000, and formed a
30-share syndicate which included all the earlier investors in
Beau Pere.
Many owners have expressed the opinion that their horse
looked like a million, but the first time that price was realized for
a horse was in 1955, when the William Woodward Jr. estate offered champion Nashua for sale by sealed bid. Combs bought
him for $1,251,200 on behalf of a 32-share syndicate; the underbidders were syndicates. While the stallion syndicate had become common, the syndicate agreement was not standard.
As every young attorney knows, when first confronted with
the task of drafting articles of incorporation there is nothing
handier than a good form, well stocked with tried and true
Words and Phrases. When asked to draft my first stallion syndicate agreement in 1959, I collected copies of every such agreement I could find in Central Kentucky. Gayle Mohney, who had
drafted the two-page Beau Pere agreement largely from similar
agreements in England, where multiple ownership of stallions
was not uncommon in 1947, had required five pages to cover the
complexities of the Nashua syndication in 1955.
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After studying all the syndicate agreements at hand, I put together a collage of provisions which, exclusive of its several counterparts, amounted to seven pages. This, in my considered judgment at the time, was the Model Syndicate Agreement, the ultimate contract, accounting for all contingencies, precluding dispute between unknown but interested parties, lengthy yet succinct-so tight it would bounce like a basketball if dropped on
the desktop. Within a very few years, it would require twenty
pages to set out the pertinent provisions in the agreement to syndicate Seattle Slew with share values totaling $12 million.
While properly there should be no arithmetic ratio of contract pages to value of the stallion, one might suspect that if the
winner of the 1982 English Derby is indeed syndicated for more
than $40 million, attorneys representing purchasers of the forty
syndicate shares-corporations and individuals residing in diverse jurisdictions here and abroad-will insist upon an extensive
document to incorporate all conceivable contractual safeguards
against mischance on this investment.
Because there is so much money involved (the $250,000 stud
fee is a reality; one yearling has been auctioned for more than
$4.25 million; and a broodmare for $2.15 million, while multimillion-dollar stallion syndicates are common) more attorneys
have become involved in horse transactions. Because so many
more people are financially involved in racing, litigation has become more frequent.
In 1941, only 13,683 Thoroughbreds raced for but $18 million in purses. In 1981, there were 65,797 Thoroughbreds racing
for $508 million. In four decades then, the number of horses racing in North America-and number of owners, trainers,
jockeys-has increased almost five-fold; while the money they
are racing for has become 28 times more serious.
The traditional penalty for wrongdoers, ever since Charles II
started organized racing at Newmarket more than three centuries ago, has been exclusion from the game, "ruling off the
Turf." The period of suspended participation-days, a year, or
for life-depends upon the degree of wrong done as found by
stewards of the course.
The frequency of challenges to stewards' decisions has
changed from almost-never to almost-always. Not too long ago, a
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five-day suspension could be meted and routinely served without
objection. Today, however, almost any five days on the racing
calendar includes the running of a stakes race, ranging in value
from the midweek $50,000-added affair to the Arlington Million.
A winning jockey and winning trainer each receives 10% of the
purse, a considerable sum not available to them if suspended.
Consequently, there has been an extraordinary increase in the
numbers of appeal of stewards' decisions, and court stays of penalties, since the time when a five-day suspension might preclude
earning $50. Upon judicial review, many traditional racing rules
and regulations have been found wanting.
Historically, racing rules were promulgated by individual
jockey clubs, and were applicable only to club members who
owned the race course and all the horses which raced there and
who provided all the purse monies through club dues and race
subscriptions. Such racing rules were comparable to those posted
by country clubs today, applicable to members using the club's
golf course. Near uniformity of racing rules existed in 19th century America because all jockey clubs with pretense to respectability adopted, in whole or in part, the Newmarket Rules. These
had been prescribed by the English Jockey Club circa 1750 and
were sternly administered for more than a century by Sir Charles
Bunbury and his successor Dictators of the Tuif, Lord George
Bentinck and Admiral John Henry Rous.
Whether it was the absence of a comparable Dictator of the
Turf here or that the rules were inadequate to curb the natural
villainy of man as seemed to surface in the bookmaking operations that dominated American tracks in the 1890s, betting on
race horses around the turn of the century came to be regarded as
a public nuisance. By 1911, when the tracks were closed in New
York, all states prohibited betting on horse races save Kentucky
and Maryland.
Where the sport survived, or was revived, was determined by
individual state legislative enactment permitting only that horse
racing regulated by the state, through an administrative agency,
with pari-mutuel wagering thereon. The last of the legal ontrack bookmakers were ruled off in 1940 when the New York assembly finally came to grips with the court-sanctioned artifice of
"oral betting," and required installation of the Tote machine and
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its pari-mutuel system.
With legislative directives to prescribe rules under which licensees could participate in racing, each state racing commission
produced its own rule book. These varied widely in substance,
style, and legal efficacy. Some states merely adopted the old rules
of racing as promulgated by the Jockey Club in New York, rules
still published in the Racing Manual, but which have had no
legal effect since the 1951 decision in Fink v. Cole,2 stripped the
private club of its assumed authority to issue and deny racing licenses. Some states left the rule drafting to stewards, who were
cognizant of the customs of the Turf, but imprecise in stating
them; other commissions assigned the task to newly appointed assistant Attorneys General, who were schooled in the art of legal
drafting, but nescient on racing.
The Kentucky rule book was written in 1906, and some of its
eloquent phrasing is extant today. Many of its rules were
amended piecemeal. Special rules were inserted to cover singular
situations, some boilerplate language was lifted from rules in
other jurisdictions; and the whole-including contradictory provisions and lapsed traditions all-was counted a fine book of racing rules until 1968. Then it was put to use in the full-blown appeal of denial of first-money in the Kentucky Derby to the owner
of Dancer's Image.
The Kentucky rules quickly were revealed to be inadequate
in many procedural and substantive respects. Not the least of
these shortcomings was omission of specific wording whereby
Dancer's Image could be disqualified from first place. The closest
applicable rule was 14.06, which only provided that upon a
chemist's finding of a derivative of prohibited phenylbutazone in
a post-race urinalysis, "such horse shall not participate in the
purse distribution."
The issue of whether Dancer's Image won the Kentucky
Derby with a prohibited medication in his system went up and
down the judicial ladder several times, and Kentucky's highest
court finally determined the outcome of the 1968 Kentucky
N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1951).
3 Ky. State Racing Comm'n, Rules of Racing and Kentucky State Racing Act, Rule
14.06 (1968 ed.). See also Kentucky State Racing Comm'n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 301
297

(Ky. 1972).
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Derby four years after its running, reversing the lower court and
upholding the racing commission's finding of fact that Dancer's
Image did race on Bute. 4 The matter of whether Dancer's Image
remained the undisqualified winner in sale-catalogue pedigree
notes and on Churchill Downs signs and thus entitled to the winner's gold cup, remained in legal doubt until a successor racing
commission ordered he was "unplaced for all purposes" and the
appeal of this ruling was dismissed in circuit court in 1973.
Re-writing of the Kentucky rule book from scratch required
five years of study, drafting, debate, formal hearings and informal discussions between stewards, practicing attorneys, trainers,
veterinarians, horse owners and breeders, racing commissioners
in other states and some bystanders such as myself. During this
extended haggling, the question arose whether any racing commission had the power to enforce any administrative rules that:
1. Permitted search of a person's tack box and car for prohibited drugs and hypodermic needles, without a search warrant
before the person was aware his or her horse had tested positive
for a prohibited drug, i.e., to conduct the usual barn "shakedown;"5
2. Compelled participants to tell stewards what they knew
6
about a fixed race;
3. Provided for denial or revocation of an individual's license because of a bad reputation or association with "undesir'7
able persons;"
4. Held trainers vicariously responsible for unknown third
parties' tampering with their horses, shifting the burden of proof
to trainers to show freedom of negligence in protecting their
horses;8 and
5. Other rules that seemed to abrogate constitutional protections in criminal matters when penalty for violation of such
rules was merely exclusion from racing. 9
4 Kentucky

State Racing Comm'n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298 (Ky. 1972).
5 See Ky. State Racing Comm'n, Rules of Racing and Kentucky State Racing Act,
Rule 14.05 (1968 ed.).
BId.
7 See id. at Rules 8.16, 8.17.
8 Id. at

Rules 14.04, 14.06.
9 See, e.g., id. at Rules 14.11,23.01.
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Kentucky case law followed English tradition in the concept
that racing was a sport, participation in which was a privilege,
not a right. Kentucky case law also held that this privilege could
be granted by license, or denied, in the sole discretion of the racing commission.
Case law in other states suggested that participants in racing
have a property right in their licenses, and that this property
could not be taken from them without due process of law or
without regard to other constitutional guarantees.
While the Dancer's Image case was pending final adjudication, the Kentucky General Assembly in 1970 articulated
the policy of the commonwealth as to the privilege of participation in racing, enacting Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
230.215(1), which states in part:
Further, it is hereby declared the policy and intent of the commonwealth that the conduct of thoroughbred racing.., or
the participation in any way in thoroughbred racing ... or
the entrance to or presence where throughbred racing ...is
conducted, is a privilege and not a personal right; and that this
privilege may be granted or denied by the commission or its
duly approved representatives acting in its behalf. 10
In KRS section 230.215(2), the Kentucky legislature further
stated the purpose and intent of the racing act:
[I]n the interest of the public health, safety, and welfare, to
vest in the commission forceful control of thoroughbred racing.., in the commonwealth with plenary power to prescribe rules and regulations and conditions under which all legitimate throughbred racing.., and wagering thereon is
conducted in the commonwealth so as to encourage the improvement of the breed of thoroughbreds in the commonwealth, to regulate and maintain thoroughbred racing ... in
the commonwealth of the highest quality and free of any corrupt, incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled thoroughbred
racing... practices, and to regulate and maintain thoroughbred racing ... in the commonwealth so as to dissipate any
cloud of association with the undesirable and maintain the appearance as well as the fact of complete honesty and integrity
10 KY. REv.

STAT. ANN.

§ 230.215(1) (Bobbs-Merril 1977) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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of thoroughbred racing."
Further along in this section the legislature added:
[I]t is the intent hereby to vest in the commission the power to
eject or exclude from association grounds or any part thereof
any person, licensed or unlicensed, whose conduct or reputation is such that his presence on association grounds may, in
the opinion of the commission, reflect on the honesty and integrity of thoroughbred racing or interfere with the orderly
2
conduct of thoroughbred racing.'
Absence of this statutory provision, stating as a policy of the
state participation in racing as a privilege, not a personal right,
may have hampered racing authorities in New York in their
1981-82 attempts to exclude suspected wrongdoers from further
participation in racing. In many other jurisdictions, absence of
this statutory provision has encouraged a proliferation of suits
challenging the authority of stewards and racing commissions to
impose penalties for minor racing rule infractions.
The point of whether participation in racing is a privilege or
a right was addressed in Barry v. Barchi.13 The case involved a
trainer whose license was suspended in New York. In writing the
majority opinion, Justice White dispensed with the point in a
footnote:
Under New York law, a license may not be revoked or suspended at the discretion of the racing authorities. Rather, suspension may ensue only upon proof of certain contingencies .... Accordingly, state law has engendered a clear expectation of continued enjoyment of a license absent proof of
culpable conduct by the trainer. Barchi, therefore, has as4
serted a legitimate "claim of entitlement."'
In a separate opinion, concurring in part with the majority,
Justice Brennan wrote:
I also agree that appellee's trainer's license clothes him with a
constitutionally protected interest of which he cannot be dellKRS § 230.215(2) (1977).
Id.

12

13 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
14Id. at 64 n.l1 (citations omitted).
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prived without procedural due process.
Appellants [racing board] seek to avoid these cases by
characterizing appellee's license as a "privilege" and arguing
that one who has accepted the benefits of a license is precluded
from challenging the conditions attached to it, including the
procedures for suspension and revocation.15
Justice Brennan stated: "[t]he court properly rejects this contention-indeed does not even mention it." 16 Justice Brennan
cited Board of Regents v. Roth, 7 as emphasizing "that 'the court
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
"rights" and "privileges" that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process rights.' Having once determined
that the interest at stake is protected by the Due Process 8Clause, a
court has occasion only to inquire what process is due."'
It was a point which so concerned Justice Brennan that he
reached down to a footnote to get it. His conviction that the interest in a New York racing license is comparable to the property
interest in a driver's license would seem unlikely to be altered by
a statutory declaration of a state policy to the contrary. It should
be noted that Justice Brennan's separate opinion, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Stevens, came within one swing
vote of being the majority opinion of the high court in 1979.

15 Id. at 69-70 (Brennan, J., concurring).

16 Id. at 70 (Brennan, J., concurring).
17 408 U.S. 564 (1973).
18 443 U.S. at 71 (Brennan, J., concurring).

